diff options
author | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-11-11 07:43:12 -0500 |
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committer | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-11-11 07:45:11 -0500 |
commit | 419630e0bec46b9cb33047dea1662df0c400ade3 (patch) | |
tree | 585a136efc3f6af5be8ffe95435ccb96f59d58e7 /gnu/packages | |
parent | 875b2f3d5e7c04176239d16c1832543f315cbf91 (diff) | |
download | guix-patches-419630e0bec46b9cb33047dea1662df0c400ade3.tar guix-patches-419630e0bec46b9cb33047dea1662df0c400ade3.tar.gz |
gnu: wpa-supplicant: Add fixes for CVE-2015-{5310,5314,5315,5316}.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch: New files.
* gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Add patches.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages')
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/admin.scm | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch | 54 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch | 34 |
5 files changed, 177 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm index aba5a51a4c..6aca8570c0 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm @@ -716,7 +716,12 @@ commands and their arguments.") ".tar.gz")) (sha256 (base32 - "05mkp5bx1c3z7h5biddsv0p49gkrq9ksany3anp4wdiv92p5prfc")))) + "05mkp5bx1c3z7h5biddsv0p49gkrq9ksany3anp4wdiv92p5prfc")) + (patches + (map search-patch '("wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch"))))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (arguments '(#:phases (alist-replace diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..00e5b7c771 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no + PMF in use + +WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is +enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station +side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +index 954de67..7d79499 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + end = ptr + key_len_total; + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total); + ++ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) { ++ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, ++ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + while (ptr + 1 < end) { + if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element " diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bfc4c74e95 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation + +All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining +room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last +fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. +The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual +buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process +termination. (CVE-2015-5314) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + /* + * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set + */ +- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { + if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " + "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", +@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + } + wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); + data->in_frag_pos += len; ++ } ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", + (int) len); + return; +@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) + */ + if (data->in_frag_pos) { +- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); +- data->in_frag_pos += len; + pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); + len = data->in_frag_pos; + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..82c26398b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation + +All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining +room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last +fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. +The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual +buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process +termination. (CVE-2015-5315) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + /* + * buffer and ACK the fragment + */ +- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { + data->in_frag_pos += len; + if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " +@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + return NULL; + } + wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); +- ++ } ++ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { + resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, + EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); +@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + * we're buffering and this is the last fragment + */ + if (data->in_frag_pos) { +- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", + (int) len); +- data->in_frag_pos += len; + pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); + len = data->in_frag_pos; + } +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3088f6a6dc --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message + +If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity +exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and +data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange() +did not take this corner case into account and could end up +dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid +message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 75ceef1..892b590 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN); + + fin: +- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); ++ if (data->grp) ++ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); + BN_clear_free(x); + BN_clear_free(y); + if (data->outbuf == NULL) { +-- +1.9.1 + |