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| author | Marius Bakke <marius@gnu.org> | 2020-06-02 23:40:19 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Marius Bakke <marius@gnu.org> | 2020-06-02 23:41:35 +0200 |
| commit | 9a46e0dd843a2f4c832f74e9a503e7200c934eb7 (patch) | |
| tree | bdd1a84911e1bf91686ea99a3aa2410a6a62cf53 /gnu/packages/patches | |
| parent | 395659d86d98afaba4d311ca5618f49a4548f6ae (diff) | |
| download | guix-patches-9a46e0dd843a2f4c832f74e9a503e7200c934eb7.tar guix-patches-9a46e0dd843a2f4c832f74e9a503e7200c934eb7.tar.gz | |
gnu: dbus: Fix CVE-2020-12049.
* gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch: New file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/glib.scm (dbus/fixed): New variable.
(dbus)[replacement]: New field.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch | 58 |
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71280144a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +Fix CVE-2020-12049: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-12049 +https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/ftp-release/2020-June/000753.html + +Taken from upstream: + +https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/commit/272d484283883fa9ff95b69d924fff6cd34842f5 + +diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c +--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c ++++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c +@@ -435,18 +435,6 @@ _dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds (DBusSocket fd, + struct cmsghdr *cm; + dbus_bool_t found = FALSE; + +- if (m.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) +- { +- /* Hmm, apparently the control data was truncated. The bad +- thing is that we might have completely lost a couple of fds +- without chance to recover them. Hence let's treat this as a +- serious error. */ +- +- errno = ENOSPC; +- _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start); +- return -1; +- } +- + for (cm = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&m); cm; cm = CMSG_NXTHDR(&m, cm)) + if (cm->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cm->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) + { +@@ -501,6 +489,26 @@ _dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds (DBusSocket fd, + if (!found) + *n_fds = 0; + ++ if (m.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) ++ { ++ unsigned int i; ++ ++ /* Hmm, apparently the control data was truncated. The bad ++ thing is that we might have completely lost a couple of fds ++ without chance to recover them. Hence let's treat this as a ++ serious error. */ ++ ++ /* We still need to close whatever fds we *did* receive, ++ * otherwise they'll never get closed. (CVE-2020-12049) */ ++ for (i = 0; i < *n_fds; i++) ++ close (fds[i]); ++ ++ *n_fds = 0; ++ errno = ENOSPC; ++ _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + /* put length back (doesn't actually realloc) */ + _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start + bytes_read); + |