1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
|
Fix CVE-2017-10684 and CVE-2017-10685:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-10684
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-10685
Bug reports included proof of concept reproducer inputs:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464684
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464685
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464686
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464687
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464688
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464691
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464692
Patches copied from ncurses patch release 20170701:
ftp://invisible-island.net/ncurses/6.0/ncurses-6.0-20170701.patch.gz
Excerpt from patch release announcement:
+ add/improve checks in tic's parser to address invalid input
(Redhat #1464684, #1464685, #1464686, #1464691).
+ alloc_entry.c, add a check for a null-pointer.
+ parse_entry.c, add several checks for valid pointers as well as
one check to ensure that a single character on a line is not
treated as the 2-character termcap short-name.
+ the fixes for Redhat #1464685 obscured a problem subsequently
reported in Redhat #1464687; the given test-case was no longer
reproducible. Testing without the fixes for the earlier reports
showed a problem with buffer overflow in dump_entry.c, which is
addressed by reducing the use of a fixed-size buffer.
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-ncurses/2017-07/msg00001.html
--- ncurses-6.0-20170624+/ncurses/tinfo/alloc_entry.c 2017-04-09 23:33:51.000000000 +0000
+++ ncurses-6.0-20170701/ncurses/tinfo/alloc_entry.c 2017-06-27 23:48:55.000000000 +0000
@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@
{
char *result = 0;
size_t old_next_free = next_free;
- size_t len = strlen(string) + 1;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (string == 0)
+ return _nc_save_str("");
+ len = strlen(string) + 1;
if (len == 1 && next_free != 0) {
/*
--- ncurses-6.0-20170624+/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c 2017-06-24 22:59:46.000000000 +0000
+++ ncurses-6.0-20170701/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c 2017-06-28 00:53:12.000000000 +0000
@@ -236,13 +236,14 @@
* implemented it. Note that the resulting terminal type was never the
* 2-character name, but was instead the first alias after that.
*/
+#define ok_TC2(s) (isgraph(UChar(s)) && (s) != '|')
ptr = _nc_curr_token.tk_name;
if (_nc_syntax == SYN_TERMCAP
#if NCURSES_XNAMES
&& !_nc_user_definable
#endif
) {
- if (ptr[2] == '|') {
+ if (ok_TC2(ptr[0]) && ok_TC2(ptr[1]) && (ptr[2] == '|')) {
ptr += 3;
_nc_curr_token.tk_name[2] = '\0';
}
@@ -284,9 +285,11 @@
if (is_use || is_tc) {
entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].name = _nc_save_str(_nc_curr_token.tk_valstring);
entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].line = _nc_curr_line;
- entryp->nuses++;
- if (entryp->nuses > 1 && is_tc) {
- BAD_TC_USAGE
+ if (VALID_STRING(entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].name)) {
+ entryp->nuses++;
+ if (entryp->nuses > 1 && is_tc) {
+ BAD_TC_USAGE
+ }
}
} else {
/* normal token lookup */
@@ -588,7 +591,7 @@
static void
append_acs(string_desc * dst, int code, char *src)
{
- if (src != 0 && strlen(src) == 1) {
+ if (VALID_STRING(src) && strlen(src) == 1) {
append_acs0(dst, code, *src);
}
}
@@ -849,15 +852,14 @@
}
if (tp->Strings[to_ptr->nte_index]) {
+ const char *s = tp->Strings[from_ptr->nte_index];
+ const char *t = tp->Strings[to_ptr->nte_index];
/* There's no point in warning about it if it's the same
* string; that's just an inefficiency.
*/
- if (strcmp(
- tp->Strings[from_ptr->nte_index],
- tp->Strings[to_ptr->nte_index]) != 0)
+ if (VALID_STRING(s) && VALID_STRING(t) && strcmp(s, t) != 0)
_nc_warning("%s (%s) already has an explicit value %s, ignoring ko",
- ap->to, ap->from,
- _nc_visbuf(tp->Strings[to_ptr->nte_index]));
+ ap->to, ap->from, t);
continue;
}
--- ncurses-6.0-20170624+/progs/dump_entry.c 2017-06-23 22:47:43.000000000 +0000
+++ ncurses-6.0-20170701/progs/dump_entry.c 2017-07-01 11:27:29.000000000 +0000
@@ -841,9 +841,10 @@
PredIdx num_strings = 0;
bool outcount = 0;
-#define WRAP_CONCAT \
- wrap_concat(buffer); \
- outcount = TRUE
+#define WRAP_CONCAT1(s) wrap_concat(s); outcount = TRUE
+#define WRAP_CONCAT2(a,b) wrap_concat(a); WRAP_CONCAT1(b)
+#define WRAP_CONCAT3(a,b,c) wrap_concat(a); WRAP_CONCAT2(b,c)
+#define WRAP_CONCAT WRAP_CONCAT1(buffer)
len = 12; /* terminfo file-header */
@@ -1007,9 +1008,9 @@
set_attributes = save_sgr;
trimmed_sgr0 = _nc_trim_sgr0(tterm);
- if (strcmp(capability, trimmed_sgr0))
+ if (strcmp(capability, trimmed_sgr0)) {
capability = trimmed_sgr0;
- else {
+ } else {
if (trimmed_sgr0 != exit_attribute_mode)
free(trimmed_sgr0);
}
@@ -1046,13 +1047,21 @@
_nc_SPRINTF(buffer, _nc_SLIMIT(sizeof(buffer))
"%s=!!! %s WILL NOT CONVERT !!!",
name, srccap);
+ WRAP_CONCAT;
} else if (suppress_untranslatable) {
continue;
} else {
char *s = srccap, *d = buffer;
- _nc_SPRINTF(d, _nc_SLIMIT(sizeof(buffer)) "..%s=", name);
- d += strlen(d);
+ WRAP_CONCAT3("..", name, "=");
while ((*d = *s++) != 0) {
+ if ((d - buffer - 1) >= (int) sizeof(buffer)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%s: value for %s is too long\n",
+ _nc_progname,
+ name);
+ *d = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
if (*d == ':') {
*d++ = '\\';
*d = ':';
@@ -1061,13 +1070,12 @@
}
d++;
}
+ WRAP_CONCAT;
}
} else {
- _nc_SPRINTF(buffer, _nc_SLIMIT(sizeof(buffer))
- "%s=%s", name, cv);
+ WRAP_CONCAT3(name, "=", cv);
}
len += (int) strlen(capability) + 1;
- WRAP_CONCAT;
} else {
char *src = _nc_tic_expand(capability,
outform == F_TERMINFO, numbers);
@@ -1083,8 +1091,7 @@
strcpy_DYN(&tmpbuf, src);
}
len += (int) strlen(capability) + 1;
- wrap_concat(tmpbuf.text);
- outcount = TRUE;
+ WRAP_CONCAT1(tmpbuf.text);
}
}
/* e.g., trimmed_sgr0 */
@@ -1526,7 +1533,8 @@
}
if (len > critlen) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
- "warning: %s entry is %d bytes long\n",
+ "%s: %s entry is %d bytes long\n",
+ _nc_progname,
_nc_first_name(tterm->term_names),
len);
SHOW_WHY("# WARNING: this entry, %d bytes long, may core-dump %s libraries!\n",
|
