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From 20df7b0b3f3e7dd201c9811bbb1e6515da8da359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Randell Jesup <rjesup@jesup.org>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2015 10:17:29 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Bug 1220493 - validate RTP packets against underflows.
r=pkerr a=sylvestre
--HG--
extra : source : 575d3aa376b1c8e7507d94833f7b74bf963127cb
extra : intermediate-source : 2c1b396ef5c3e2424fb9af56d86ebf6f6551a997
---
.../webrtc/modules/rtp_rtcp/source/rtp_utility.cc | 26 ++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/media/webrtc/trunk/webrtc/modules/rtp_rtcp/source/rtp_utility.cc b/media/webrtc/trunk/webrtc/modules/rtp_rtcp/source/rtp_utility.cc
index 9334b23..80cf55a 100644
--- a/media/webrtc/trunk/webrtc/modules/rtp_rtcp/source/rtp_utility.cc
+++ b/media/webrtc/trunk/webrtc/modules/rtp_rtcp/source/rtp_utility.cc
@@ -338,12 +338,6 @@ bool RtpHeaderParser::Parse(RTPHeader& header,
return false;
}
- const uint8_t CSRCocts = CC * 4;
-
- if ((ptr + CSRCocts) > _ptrRTPDataEnd) {
- return false;
- }
-
header.markerBit = M;
header.payloadType = PT;
header.sequenceNumber = sequenceNumber;
@@ -352,6 +346,14 @@ bool RtpHeaderParser::Parse(RTPHeader& header,
header.numCSRCs = CC;
header.paddingLength = P ? *(_ptrRTPDataEnd - 1) : 0;
+ // 12 == sizeof(RFC rtp header) == kRtpMinParseLength, each CSRC=4 bytes
+ header.headerLength = 12 + (CC * 4);
+ // not a full validation, just safety against underflow. Padding must
+ // start after the header. We can have 0 payload bytes left, note.
+ if (header.paddingLength + header.headerLength > length) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < CC; ++i) {
uint32_t CSRC = *ptr++ << 24;
CSRC += *ptr++ << 16;
@@ -359,8 +361,7 @@ bool RtpHeaderParser::Parse(RTPHeader& header,
CSRC += *ptr++;
header.arrOfCSRCs[i] = CSRC;
}
-
- header.headerLength = 12 + CSRCocts;
+ assert((ptr - _ptrRTPDataBegin) == header.headerLength);
// If in effect, MAY be omitted for those packets for which the offset
// is zero.
@@ -385,8 +386,9 @@ bool RtpHeaderParser::Parse(RTPHeader& header,
| header extension |
| .... |
*/
- const ptrdiff_t remain = _ptrRTPDataEnd - ptr;
- if (remain < 4) {
+ // earlier test ensures we have at least paddingLength bytes left
+ const ptrdiff_t remain = (_ptrRTPDataEnd - ptr) - header.paddingLength;
+ if (remain < 4) { // minimum header extension length = 32 bits
return false;
}
@@ -395,11 +397,11 @@ bool RtpHeaderParser::Parse(RTPHeader& header,
uint16_t definedByProfile = *ptr++ << 8;
definedByProfile += *ptr++;
- uint16_t XLen = *ptr++ << 8;
+ size_t XLen = *ptr++ << 8;
XLen += *ptr++; // in 32 bit words
XLen *= 4; // in octs
- if (remain < (4 + XLen)) {
+ if (remain < (4 + XLen)) { // we already accounted for padding
return false;
}
if (definedByProfile == kRtpOneByteHeaderExtensionId) {
--
2.6.3
|
