diff options
author | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-07-08 18:18:40 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-07-08 18:27:37 -0400 |
commit | 9fb00f383dd7df97adf8bc603eeaa7be4e901bbd (patch) | |
tree | c1c07a30ebd4f50e04eac5a530317ab8b762a66d /gnu/packages/patches | |
parent | 16de69c950c473cc3d386cd7569bd1d6051614b6 (diff) | |
download | guix-patches-9fb00f383dd7df97adf8bc603eeaa7be4e901bbd.tar guix-patches-9fb00f383dd7df97adf8bc603eeaa7be4e901bbd.tar.gz |
gnu: wpa-supplicant: Fix WPS and P2P NFC NDEF record payload length validation.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch: New file.
* gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-light)[source]: Add patch.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch | 64 |
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..496c68ff8e --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +Original patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/ +and then backported to wpa-supplicant-2.4. + +From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser + +It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up +wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload +length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to +2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large +payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20 +bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process. +This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of +heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the +same length which would most likely result in the process termination. +In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there +would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an +infinite loop in ndef_parse_records(). + +Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service +attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or +sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing +the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the +received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack +that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing, +hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included +here. + +Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that +detects integer overflow. (CID 122668) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c +index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644 +--- a/src/wps/ndef.c ++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c +@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, + if (size < 6) + return -1; + record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos); ++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6) ++ return -1; + pos += sizeof(u32); + } + +@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, + pos += record->payload_length; + + record->total_length = pos - data; +- if (record->total_length > size) ++ if (record->total_length > size || ++ record->total_length < record->payload_length) + return -1; + return 0; + } +-- +1.9.1 + |