diff options
author | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2017-11-08 21:04:33 -0500 |
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committer | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2017-11-10 12:16:31 -0500 |
commit | adf7e69cab6180ef75360a1c0731c93f4bff2b18 (patch) | |
tree | 7cf0da9738e88fe7bb132a85636fccc315b1a9ba /gnu/packages/patches | |
parent | d4d7d70912642be18d93c9ce6470f8650097b5e5 (diff) | |
download | guix-patches-adf7e69cab6180ef75360a1c0731c93f4bff2b18.tar guix-patches-adf7e69cab6180ef75360a1c0731c93f4bff2b18.tar.gz |
gnu: qemu: Fix CVE-2017-{15038,15268,15289}.
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15038.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15289.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
* gnu/packages/virtualization.scm (qemu)[source]: Use them.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15038.patch | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch | 62 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15289.patch | 66 |
3 files changed, 179 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15038.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15038.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4791a186bf --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15038.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +Fix CVE-2017-15038: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15038 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=7bd92756303f2158a68d5166264dc30139b813b6 + +From 7bd92756303f2158a68d5166264dc30139b813b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org> +Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 14:21:59 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: use g_malloc0 to allocate space for xattr + +9p back-end first queries the size of an extended attribute, +allocates space for it via g_malloc() and then retrieves its +value into allocated buffer. Race between querying attribute +size and retrieving its could lead to memory bytes disclosure. +Use g_malloc0() to avoid it. + +Reported-by: Tuomas Tynkkynen <tuomas.tynkkynen@iki.fi> +Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> +--- + hw/9pfs/9p.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p.c b/hw/9pfs/9p.c +index 23ac7bb532..f8bbac251d 100644 +--- a/hw/9pfs/9p.c ++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p.c +@@ -3234,7 +3234,7 @@ static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque) + xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR; + xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true; + if (size) { +- xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size); ++ xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size); + err = v9fs_co_llistxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path, + xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value, + xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len); +@@ -3267,7 +3267,7 @@ static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrwalk(void *opaque) + xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR; + xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.xattrwalk_fid = true; + if (size) { +- xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size); ++ xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size); + err = v9fs_co_lgetxattr(pdu, &xattr_fidp->path, + &name, xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value, + xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len); +-- +2.15.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8238c3059f --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15268.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +Fix CVE-2017-15268: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15268 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=a7b20a8efa28e5f22c26c06cd06c2f12bc863493 + +From a7b20a8efa28e5f22c26c06cd06c2f12bc863493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2017 14:43:42 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] io: monitor encoutput buffer size from websocket GSource + +The websocket GSource is monitoring the size of the rawoutput +buffer to determine if the channel can accepts more writes. +The rawoutput buffer, however, is merely a temporary staging +buffer before data is copied into the encoutput buffer. Thus +its size will always be zero when the GSource runs. + +This flaw causes the encoutput buffer to grow without bound +if the other end of the underlying data channel doesn't +read data being sent. This can be seen with VNC if a client +is on a slow WAN link and the guest OS is sending many screen +updates. A malicious VNC client can act like it is on a slow +link by playing a video in the guest and then reading data +very slowly, causing QEMU host memory to expand arbitrarily. + +This issue is assigned CVE-2017-15268, publically reported in + + https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1718964 + +Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> +Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> +--- + io/channel-websock.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/io/channel-websock.c b/io/channel-websock.c +index d1d471f86e..04bcc059cd 100644 +--- a/io/channel-websock.c ++++ b/io/channel-websock.c +@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ + #include <time.h> + + +-/* Max amount to allow in rawinput/rawoutput buffers */ ++/* Max amount to allow in rawinput/encoutput buffers */ + #define QIO_CHANNEL_WEBSOCK_MAX_BUFFER 8192 + + #define QIO_CHANNEL_WEBSOCK_CLIENT_KEY_LEN 24 +@@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ qio_channel_websock_source_check(GSource *source) + if (wsource->wioc->rawinput.offset || wsource->wioc->io_eof) { + cond |= G_IO_IN; + } +- if (wsource->wioc->rawoutput.offset < QIO_CHANNEL_WEBSOCK_MAX_BUFFER) { ++ if (wsource->wioc->encoutput.offset < QIO_CHANNEL_WEBSOCK_MAX_BUFFER) { + cond |= G_IO_OUT; + } + +-- +2.15.0 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15289.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15289.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d4b536a405 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15289.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +Fix CVE-2017-15289: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15289 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=eb38e1bc3740725ca29a535351de94107ec58d51 + +From eb38e1bc3740725ca29a535351de94107ec58d51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> +Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 10:43:14 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access in mode4and5 write functions + +Move dst calculation into the loop, so we apply the mask on each +interation and will not overflow vga memory. + +Cc: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org> +Reported-by: Niu Guoxiang <niuguoxiang@huawei.com> +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> +Message-id: 20171011084314.21752-1-kraxel@redhat.com +--- + hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c +index b4d579857a..bc32bf1e39 100644 +--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c ++++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c +@@ -2038,15 +2038,14 @@ static void cirrus_mem_writeb_mode4and5_8bpp(CirrusVGAState * s, + unsigned val = mem_value; + uint8_t *dst; + +- dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (offset &= s->cirrus_addr_mask); + for (x = 0; x < 8; x++) { ++ dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + ((offset + x) & s->cirrus_addr_mask); + if (val & 0x80) { + *dst = s->cirrus_shadow_gr1; + } else if (mode == 5) { + *dst = s->cirrus_shadow_gr0; + } + val <<= 1; +- dst++; + } + memory_region_set_dirty(&s->vga.vram, offset, 8); + } +@@ -2060,8 +2059,8 @@ static void cirrus_mem_writeb_mode4and5_16bpp(CirrusVGAState * s, + unsigned val = mem_value; + uint8_t *dst; + +- dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (offset &= s->cirrus_addr_mask); + for (x = 0; x < 8; x++) { ++ dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + ((offset + 2 * x) & s->cirrus_addr_mask & ~1); + if (val & 0x80) { + *dst = s->cirrus_shadow_gr1; + *(dst + 1) = s->vga.gr[0x11]; +@@ -2070,7 +2069,6 @@ static void cirrus_mem_writeb_mode4and5_16bpp(CirrusVGAState * s, + *(dst + 1) = s->vga.gr[0x10]; + } + val <<= 1; +- dst += 2; + } + memory_region_set_dirty(&s->vga.vram, offset, 16); + } +-- +2.15.0 + |