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author | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-05-11 12:46:31 -0400 |
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committer | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-05-11 12:51:47 -0400 |
commit | d48c8e7b6070a63dc12ead0bb9ea47b790e237f0 (patch) | |
tree | addb863d86c362a9287f9277bdc65d79620ab306 /gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch | |
parent | 1ec78e9d71d7c38c5739c90d3927e227bce23caa (diff) | |
download | guix-patches-d48c8e7b6070a63dc12ead0bb9ea47b790e237f0.tar guix-patches-d48c8e7b6070a63dc12ead0bb9ea47b790e237f0.tar.gz |
gnu: wpa-supplicant: Add security fixes.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-3-fix.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt1.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch: New files.
* gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-light)[source]: Add patches.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch | 51 |
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cd097006d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-2-fix.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/ + +From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser + +strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and +resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could +result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length +argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault. + +This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that +has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This +would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with +upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER +(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used). + +Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to +rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be +larger than the maximum configured body length. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c +index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644 +--- a/src/wps/httpread.c ++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c +@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + if (!isxdigit(*cbp)) + goto bad; + h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16); ++ if (h->chunk_size < 0 || ++ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d", ++ h->chunk_size); ++ goto bad; ++ } + /* throw away chunk header + * so we have only real data + */ +-- +1.9.1 + |